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THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING

The public accounting profession has come under heavy

attack in recent times because of the perceptions of its critics
and the emerging recognition, particularly in Congress, of financial

reporting and the importance of the role of auditors.

The

criticisms of the profession are leading to profound changes,
especially in the role and responsibilities of auditors.

Because

the ultimate objective of these changes is to provide improved
corporate accountability they will have a significant impact on
corporate management as well.

To place the recent developments in perspective let me
give you a brief overview of why the profession has come under
such heavy criticism.

Auditors have traditionally been looked to as a
principal means of providing a reasonable degree of assurance
as to the reliability of financial statements to help protect

investors and credit grantors from being misled by misrepresenta
tions or frauds.

More recently, however, the function has taken

on added dimensions because government officials have come to

realize that:

1.

Financial statements underlie the financial
data and statistics which are used in the
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formation of national policies, particularly
those relating to the economy and capital

formation.
2.

Independent audits are a vital ingredient in

the scheme of control over the conduct and
accountability of the corporate entity within
our society.

It is understandable, then, that when audited financial
statements have proved to be

misleading on the basis of subsequent

events, such as unheralded business failures, questions are raised
as to how this could happen.

Assumptions are made that the

auditors failed to meet their responsibilities either as a result
of deficient performance of their work, or worse, that they knowingly
placed their imprimatur on misleading financial statements.

These perceptions stem in large part from the often
unconscious belief that an auditor’s opinion should be expected

to provide an absolute guarantee that:

1.

Financial statements are reliable
and that

2.

Any material management frauds have been detected

and disclosed.

Even more extreme is the expectation that the auditor
is representing by his opinion that the judgments and actions
of management have been of high quality and in the best interests
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of all who may rely on the financial statements.

Some also seem

to expect that an auditor’s opinion denotes that investment in
or extensions of credit to the company will be both safe and

profitable.
These exaggerated expectations contribute heavily to
the belief on the part of many critics that the profession is

failing to satisfactorily carry out its mission.

Anything less

than zero defects in financial reporting is viewed by these
individuals as being unsatisfactory.

The profession devoutly shares the desire to reach
such a state of perfection in an imperfect world.

But attain

ment of such an objective is not a realistic expectation.

Even though perfection is not attainable, the profession
has a responsibility to strive constantly to improve the effective

ness of audits to the maximum extent that is reasonably achievable.
Accordingly it is entirely appropriate to ask the question of

whether the profession is satisfactorily meeting that responsibility.

To answer that question, the AICPA appointed a special
commission in 1974 to examine the responsibilities of auditors in
the light of legitimate expectations of the public.

Prior to his
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untimely death, the Commission was chaired by Manuel Cohen, former
Chairman of the SEC.

The Commission was initially composed of

seven members, four drawn from other disciplines and interest
groups and three from the ranks of the auditing profession.
A report on its preliminary conclusions was published

on April 1, 1977.

Based upon responses and public hearings on

its tentative views the Commission has now completed its work

and its final report was published on February 1, 1978.

The report contains

over 40 recommendations for improving the way in which the profes
sion meets its responsibilities.

The conclusions are based in

part upon an extensive body of research into the underlying causes
of the allegations directed at the auditing profession.

Unfortunately

the Commission directed only a limited amount of its attention to
the question of whether public expectations were unreasonable and,

if so, what might be done to solve this problem.
In the meantime, while the Commission was deliberating,
the fast-moving developments within federal government circles

relating to the profession made it necessary for the profession
to respond in its own behalf to the allegations being made about
its performance.

The Metcalf subcommittee staff study of the

profession and the Moss subcommittee report on its oversight of

the SEC raised a number of fundamental questions that required an
immediate and comprehensive response if unwanted legislation was
to be avoided.

In general, it was asserted in these reports that the
performance of auditors has not been as good as it should be.

The
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reasons for this judgment were not clearly articulated but

invariably when this judgment is made the number of spectacular
business failures which occurred during the last decade are cited

as evidence.

To a large extent the criticisms are a result of a
loss of confidence in the integrity of business.

The energy

crisis spawned widespread doubts about the reliability of the
financial and statistical reports of the oil and gas industry. Also,

the revelations about illegal political contributions, bribes
and off-book slush funds caused untold damage to the credibility

of corporate management.
It does not follow, of course, that these events were

necessarily accompanied by failures of auditors to meet their

responsibilities-.

Nevertheless it is clear that the result has

been a serious erosion in the credibility of the independent
auditors.

This loss of confidence is focused principally on

perceptions that audit failures occur because:

1.

The accounting and auditing standards being set
in the private sector

are deficient in quality,

quantity and timeliness.

Therefore it is sug

gested by some that the setting of these standards
should be transferred to a government agency.

2.

The auditors were negligent and exercised poor
judgment or were not sufficiently independent
of their clients and either knowingly or
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unconsciously projected the interests of manage

ment at the expense of shareholders and other
users of financial statements.

3.

The profession’s technical, independence and due
care standards are not being enforced and CPAs
and CPA firms are not being adequately punished.

Therefore the SEC is urged by the critics to

exercise its enforcement authority more vigorously
and additional forms of governmental regulation
of the profession are alleged to be necessary.
These perceptions are so serious that the profession can
ill afford to ignore them even if they are greatly exaggerated.

I

believe it is safe to say that a great majority of the profession
would vigorously assert that such conclusions are not supported

by the facts.

Unfortunately it is difficult to mount objective

proof that the indictment of the profession's performance is either

warranted or unwarranted.
In any event, if those who are judging the profession

are convinced that reforms are necessary it is not terribly
effective to tell them their judgments are faulty and to engage

in what has become popularly known as "stonewalling”.

The

distinctions between appearances and fact have become so blurred

in our society that it is almost irrelevant as to whether
appearances are distorted.

Thus the profession has taken action
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to effect changes based upon the allegations of its critics even
though I am certain that a great many CPAs are unconvinced of the

validity of the necessity for such reforms.

Because of the perceived deficiencies in the performance

of auditors and the accountability of corporate management there
has been an avalanche of recommendations for reform.

These have

been put forward by congressional committees and their staffs,
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, the SEC and by CPAs

themselves in their testimony and written submissions to Congress.

Some of the suggested changes were already under consideration by

the AICPA even before they were recommended by others.
Many of the changes which we have adopted, particularly

those in response to the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities,
are aimed at improved corporate accountability.

Others are intended

to bolster the independence of auditors and establishing an effect
ive system of regulation of CPA firms.

Because of time constraints I will discuss only very

briefly each of the items that comprise our program for response

to the critics.

I believe this will be sufficient to convince you

that the profession is indeed undergoing major and far-reaching
changes.
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I.

Accounting and Auditing Standards
At various times individual members of Congress have

expressed concern about allowing the private sector to set

accounting standards.

Some have alleged that misleading financial

statements have occurred because the private-sector standard setting
bodies have been unwilling to eliminate accounting alternatives

that were advantageous to corporate interests.
to assert that the auditing

These critics tend

profession has been the captive of its

clients and is not to be entrusted with direct responsibility for

setting the standards.

The suggested cure has been to transfer the standard
setting to a government body.

Some have urged that the SEC exercise

its existing statutory authority by rescinding its policy of looking

to the FASB.

Others have, recommended that the GAO or a wholly new

governmental body be given the responsibility to set accounting

standards.
As a result of a vigorous defense of the FASB before

congressional committees it currently appears that the recommendations
for government setting of accounting standards will not prevail.
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This issue has, at least for the time being, cooled down and been

replaced by proposals for additional federal regulation of the

profession.

Nevertheless the present arrangement between the SEC

and the FASB is not entirely secure and its future is inextricably

intertwined with the fate of the profession with respect to
possible federal regulation.

The jurisdiction over the setting of auditing standards
has also become the subject of recommendations for change.

Congressman Moss has suggested that such standards be set either
by the SEC or under a statutory regulatory body for the profession
similar to the National Association of Securities Dealers.

Also

the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities recommended that
the Institute’s present auditing standards executive committee be

converted into a full-time paid board and suggested other
structural changes, as well.

In response to these recommendations the Institute
appointed a special committee to study the present structure of
AudSEC and recommend what changes, if any, should be considered in
the way auditing standards are established.

The committee released

a summary of its recommendations on March 1, 1978.

Among other

things, it recommended the retention of an all-volunteer body of
15 members within the Institute to set auditing standards.

Also,

to provide a formal vehicle for obtaining the views of interested
user groups outside the profession, establishment of an advisory
council was recommended.

The committee’s report is currently under

consideration by the AICPA’s Board of Directors and Council.
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Retention of the establishment

of both accounting

and auditing standards in the private sector is dependent to a

large

extent upon whether the profession is successful in avoiding federal
legislation to establish a statutory regulatory system for the

profession.

If such a

regulatory body were to be

established under the oversight of the SEC the odds would be
very high that the functions of both AudSEC and the FASB would

be included under the new

II.

structure.

Regulation of the Profession

Congressman Moss’s subcommittee recently completed

hearings which focused on the progress of the profession toward

establishing an improved system of self-regulation.

Mr. Moss

has stated publicly on several occasions that if he was not

satisfied

he would introduce legislation to establish a quasi-

governmental body similar to the National Association of Securities
Dealers and under the oversight of the SEC to regulate the profession.

The Institute's response has been to establish a division
for CPA firms with two sections, one for SEC Practice and another

for Private Companies Practice.

The two sections are substantially

parallel except that some of the requirements of the Private

Companies Practice Section are tailored to be more relevant to needs

of non-public companies.
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The SEC Practice Section imposes regulatory requirements
on participating firms (in addition to those previously mentioned)

as follows :
a.

Mandatory continuing professional education of

120 hours over 3 years for all professional staff mem

bers with a minimum of 20 hours each year.

b.

A mandatory peer review of the firm at least

every three years and at such other times as may
be imposed as part of a disciplinary action.

c.

Imposition of sanctions on firms found to be

deficient in meeting the quality control standards

of the AICPA.

d.

Annual filing of relevant information about the

firm for inclusion in files open to public inspection.
This will not, however, include financial statements.

e.

Maintenance of minimum amounts of legal liability
insurance as prescribed by the executive committee
of the section.
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The key to the success of this self-regulatory scheme
for CPA firms with SEC practice is the appointment of a Public

Oversight Board to monitor the operations of the section and report

at its discretion any information, findings or views to the SEC,
congressional committees or the public at large.
a.

The Board will:

Consist of five prominent individuals from outside
the profession and having unquestioned reputations
and integrity.

b.

Have access to all files, meetings and activities

of the section.
to hire its own staff as required.

c.

Have authority

d.

Be compensated from dues charged to member firms.

Although membership in the section is voluntary it is

believed that peer, client and public pressures will cause membership
for firms auditing SEC companies to be mandatory for all practical

purposes.
It is too early to know whether the Institute’s program

for self-regulation will function satisfactorily or whether it
will be given a chance to prove itself.

Congressman Moss has

promised to introduce legislation despite a hearing record that
does not support such action at this time.

Also, a lawsuit has

been filed against the Institute by a group of members seeking to

force submitting the division for firms program to a membership

referendum.
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Even though the outcome of these challenges is
uncertain I am optimistic that legislation will not be enacted
at this time and that the courts will confirm that a membership

referendum is not required under the Institute’s bylaws.

Given

the opportunity to function I believe that the division for firms

will prove to be an excellent vehicle for effective self-regulation.

III. Independence of Auditors and Improved Corporate Accountability

The concerns of the SEC and Congressional committees
regarding the independence of auditors are based upon the more

fundamental desires to achieve improvements in corporate account
ability.

Therefore any steps to enhance the independence of auditors

are really directed toward both objectives and I shall discuss them
in this context.

Perhaps the most important of the many recommendations
under this subject is the belief that independent audit committees

will be the cure for a great number of perceived deficiencies.

The

role of such committees is to act as a watchdog over the conduct
of management and to serve as a buffer between management and the

independent auditors.

The AICPA’s Board of Directors, at the strong urging of
the SEC, has appointed a special committee to study whether and
how the AICPA could impose a requirement for a public company to

have an audit committee as a condition of expressing an unqualified
audit opinion on the company’s financial statements.

The Institute

has agreed to use its best efforts to achieve such an objective

-14probably through the establishment of an auditing standard
requiring a disclosure if a company fails to have a prescribed

type of audit committee.
In addition to audit committees a number of other

measures have been suggested by the SEC, the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities and the report of the late Senator

Metcalf’s subcommittee.

The Institute has acted in response to

each of these recommendations and I will simply give you a list without
taking the time to explain them in detail.
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Reviewing and reporting publicly on systems of
internal control of SEC companies.

2.

Reports by management indicating the responsibilities
they assume for their financial statements.

3.

Reviews and reports on managements actions to assure

compliance with their policy statements on expected
conduct.

4.

Engagement, dismissal and setting fees of auditors by

audit committees or boards of directors of SEC clients.

5.

Required attendance of auditors at annual shareholders

meetings of publicly held companies.

6.

Reporting change of auditors information in audited
financial statements of SEC companies.

7.

SEC Practice Section requirements including:

a.

Reporting disagreements with management to the

audit committee or board of directors.
b.

Proscriptions of certain types of management con
sulting services and annual reports on such services

to the audit committee or board of directors.
c.

Annual reports of all SEC clients where fees exceed
5% of gross fees.

d.

Mandatory rotation every 5 years of audit partner

on SEC audits.

e.

Mandatory second partner reviews on all SEC engage
ments .
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measures are implemented there will be improvement in both the

independence of auditors and in corporate accountability.

However,

I fear that people in government may have expectations that these

actions will be a great panacea and that no future difficulties
will be encountered in financial reporting or corporate conduct.
If this is the case we are destined to experience another round

of investigation, hearings and criticism at some future date.
Let us hope that the perceptions at that time will be more

realistic and the expectations more reasonable.
IV.

Relief for Small and/or Closely Held Businesses

There is growing awareness within the profession and

in other sectors as well that, in setting accounting standards, too
little attention has been paid to their relevance when applied to

smaller privately held companies.

It has become increasingly

obvious that standards designed for publicly-held companies do not

always make sense with respect to non-public companies.

Some types

of disclosures are either irrelevant or their costs far exceed any
benefits to the users of financial statements in the particular

circumstances.
The report of the late Senator Metcalf's subcommittee

and the report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
both recognized this problem and urged that it be given greater
attention.

The Institute has been addressing this problem with
increasing urgency over the past three years.

several steps:

It has taken
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1.

A special committee has been working with the

FASB, the SEC and the AICPA Board of Directors
to urge the FASB to limit application of certain

portions of the financial accounting standards

to publicly-traded companies.

As a result of these

efforts the FASB has indicated its intent to exempt
non-publicly-traded companies from earnings-per-share
and segments of a business disclosures and has placed
on its agenda a proposal to include other types of
disclosures outside financial statements subject

to expressions of opinion by auditors.
2.

A previously appointed subcommittee of AudSEC

to deal with the subject of unaudited financial
statements has been upgraded to the status of a

senior committee with the authority to issue its
own standards on accounting and review type engage
ments.

An exposure draft of its first proposed

pronouncement has just been issued.
3.

The Private Companies Practice Section has been
established in part to facilitate tailoring practice

standards to recognize the differences in needs of
smaller privately-held companies.

By institutionalizing

the differences, the need for their recognition when

setting standards will be more widely accepted.
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Providing for exceptions in the application of

standards poses a difficult problem of educating users of
financial statements.

In addition, many practitioners have an

uneasy feeling that differential standards based upon size and

ownership of companies will lead to public perceptions that

there are first and second classes of financial statements and
first and second class auditors.

Of course, this condition

already exists to the extent that there are unaudited and audited
classifications.
The public and the profession cannot have it both ways.

Relief from unduly burdensome standards cannot be achieved for
smaller privately-held businesses without adopting exceptions to
the application of standards required for publicly-traded companies.

I believe the time to make such exceptions is overdue and that we
will be pursuing this course further in the coming months.

V.

Other Matters

The Institute has a great number of other changes underway
which are in various stages of implementation.

I will simply list

them for you without further explanation.

1.

Meetings of Council and senior committees are now
open to the public.

2.

We have voted in favor of adding three public

members to the Board of Directors.
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3.

We have reduced big 8 representation on all
senior committees to five or less.

4.

We have removed some of the secrecy from
disciplinary actions.

5.

We have voted in favor of modification of the rules

on advertising and solicitation, incompatible
occupations and employment of employees of other

CPA firms.

6.

We are embarked on a program to overhaul the
present standard auditor’s report.

7.

Adoption of a separate footnote describing
uncertainties is being urged for adoption by the

FASB.
8.

A continuing committee on searching for and

detecting fraud has been appointed.

9.

We are attempting to develop criteria for

departures from generally accepted accounting
principles when there are unusual circumstances.

Summary and Conclusion
I believe that you will agree that what I have just

described constitutes an impressive and massive response to
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nearly all of the criticisms and recommendations that have

emanated from the two congressional subcommittees and the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities.

To be sure, many of

the actions will require a good deal of time to be fully implemented.
But the important thing is that they are all in motion and have
the full support of the Institute’s governing bodies.

Parts of

the program will require the cooperation and action by management

or other entities.

However we are dedicated to using our best

efforts to achieve the objectives that have been adopted.
We hope that the result of all these efforts will be:

1.

Retention by the private sector of the authority
to establish accounting and auditing standards.

2.

Enhancement of the credibility and accountability

of corporations and management.
3.

Enchancement of the quality of work and the

independence of auditors and the credibility of

the profession.
4.

Better regulation not only of individual CPAs but
of CPA firms under a self-regulatory scheme and

avoidance of the imposition by legislation of a
federal regulatory body for the profession.

5.

Greater participation by local practitioners in
the affairs of the profession.
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6.

Establishment of a basis for drawing distinctions
between public and smaller non-public companies
for purposes of applicability of technical standards.

Will we be successful in achieving these results?

one can say for certain, but I sincerely hope so.

No

If we fail, it

will not be because we did not try our best to correct our faults

as perceived by our critics.
Despite all the problems, I remain highly optimistic.

If we have the will, the imagination and the statesmanship we can

all make a great contribution to preserving our free enterprise

system and arresting the trend toward an all pervasive federal
government.

